Covers four pillars of safety statistics: cross-disciplinary scientific engagement, effective and efficient operational process, visual analytics, and intelligent data architecture Links safety monitoring to benefit risk evaluation Presents an emerging topic that links to ICH E19 and TransCelerate safety efforts

"Democracy in Deficit" is one of the early comprehensive attempts to apply the basic principles of public-choice analysis to macroeconomic theory and policy.
According to Robert D. Tollison in the foreword, "The central purpose of the book was to examine the simple precepts of Keynesian economics through the lens of public-choice theory. The basic discovery was that Keynesian economics had a bias toward deficits in terms of political self-interest."
"Democracy in Deficit" opened the door for much of the current work on political business cycles and the incorporation of public-choice considerations into macroeconomic theory. Even in the area of monetarism, Buchanan's landmark work has greatly influenced the sway of contemporary theorists away from the nearly universally held belief of Keynesian theory.
"Democracy in Deficit" contributes greatly to Buchanan's lifelong fiscal and monetary rules to guide long-term policy in macroeconomics. The book serves to bolster Buchanan's central beliefs in the necessity of a balanced-budget amendment to the U.S. Constitution and in monetary rules rather than central bank discretion.
The book is co-authored with Richard Wagner, a respected colleague of Buchanan, whom Buchanan recognized as helping to keep the book free of polemics and on target with its central purpose of applying the elementary theory of public choice.
James M. Buchanan is an eminent economist who won the Alfred Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 1986 and is considered one of the greatest scholars of liberty in the twentieth century.
The entire series will include:
Volume 1 "The Logical Foundations of Constitutional Liberty"
Volume 2 "Public Principles of Public Debt "
Volume 3 "The Calculus of Consent "
Volume 4 "Public Finance in Democratic Process"
Volume 5 "The Demand and Supply of Public Goods"
Volume 6 "Cost and Choice"
Volume 7 "The Limits of Liberty"
Volume 8 "Democracy in Deficit"
Volume 9 "The Power to Tax"
Volume 10 "The Reason of Rules"
Volume 11 "Politics by Principle, Not Interest"
Volume 12 "Economic Inquiry and Its Logic"
Volume 13 "Politics as Public Choice"
Volume 14 "Debt and Taxes"
Volume 15 "Externalities and Public Expenditure Theory"
Volume 16 "Choice, Contract, and Constitutions"
Volume 17 "Moral Science and Moral Order"
Volume 18 "Federalism, Liberty, and the Law"
Volume 19 "Ideas, Persons, and Events"
Volume 20 "Indexes"

"Morality and Community in the Extended Market Order" is volume seven of a series of seven lectures sponsored by Liberty Fund and the Committee on Social Thought at the University of Chicago in celebration of the hundredth anniversary of F. A. Hayek's birth.
Buchanan is a pioneer of the theory of public choice, extending models of economic exchange to the realm of political decision-making. Buchanan's work on the constitutional and contractual bases of collective political action has contributed new insights into the relationships between taxation, public expenditure, and public finance.

Economic Evaluation in Genomic and Precision Medicine provides an in-depth examination of essential concepts, protocols and applications of economic evaluation in genomic and precision medicine. Contributions from leading international medical geneticists and health economists compile new ways to effectively assess the costs and outcomes of different genomic care pathways, implement cost-effective medical interventions, and enhance the value of genomic and precision healthcare. Foundational chapters and discipline-specific case studies cover topics ranging from the economic analysis of genomic trial design, to health technology assessment of next-generation sequencing, ethical aspects, economic policy in genomic medicine, and pricing and reimbursement in clinical genomics.

This volume presents a collection of Buchanan's most representative works in economic method and analysis. As Robert D. Tollison points out in his foreword, " Included] in this volume are some of Buchanan's] most often cited works on methodology, including papers reflecting his emphasis on the subjective nature of opportunity costs and the implications of this subjectivity for economic analysis."

The works collected in this volume also demonstrate Buchanan's interest throughout his career in the ideas and issues posed by economic theory. Buchanan shows throughout this volume that he believes economic theory can help explain the world around us.

Spanning nearly his entire fifty-year career, Buchanan's writings in this volume exhibit a consistency of thought and belief as ideas recur from paper to paper, ever richer and more resonant.

The thirty-six works represented here are grouped into the major categories:
1.The Practice and Method of Economic Theory
2.Competition and Entrepreneurship
3.The Theory of Monopoly
4.Input Prices
5.Opportunity Cost and Efficient Prices
6.Increasing Returns and the Work Ethic
7.Economic Theory in a Post-Socialist World

Clearly, these papers as a whole reflect a broad range of issues and provide us with countless insights. More than this, they give us a picture of the theorist in his workshop. They acquaint us with what interests him and how he deals with important issues.

In his conclusion to the opening essay, "Is Economics the Science of Choice?" Buchanan typifies the richness of thought available throughout this volume: "Modern economics, as practiced by professional scholars, embodies confusions that are fundamentally methodological. For myself, I advance no claim that my own thinking has yet fully rid itself of the paradigms of neoclassical orthodoxy."

James M. Buchanan is an eminent economist who won the Alfred Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 1986 and is considered one of the greatest scholars of liberty in the twentieth century.

The entire series will include:

Volume 1 "The Logical Foundations of Constitutional Liberty"
Volume 2 "Public Principles of Public Debt "
Volume 3 "The Calculus of Consent "
Volume 4 "Public Finance in Democratic Process"
Volume 5 "The Demand and Supply of Public Goods"
Volume 6 "Cost and Choice"
Volume 7 "The Limits of Liberty"
Volume 8 "Democracy in Deficit"
Volume 9 "The Power to Tax"
Volume 10 "The Reason of Rules"
Volume 11 "Politics by Principle, Not Interest"
Volume 12 "Economic Inquiry and Its Logic"
Volume 13 "Politics as Public Choice"
Volume 14 "Debt and Taxes"
Volume 15 "Externalities and Public Expenditure Theory"
Volume 16 "Choice, Contract, and Constitutions"
Volume 17 "Moral Science and Moral Order"
Volume 18 "Federalism, Liberty, and the Law"
Volume 19 "Ideas, Persons, and Evennts"

This volume presents a collection of thirty-four essays and shorter works by James M. Buchanan that represent the brilliance of his founding work on public-choice theory.
The work of James M. Buchanan is perhaps most often associated with his helping to found public-choice theory. Buchanan's book-length works such as "The Calculus of Consent" or "The Reason of Rules" (Volumes 3 and 10, respectively, in Liberty Fund's "The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan") are best known for their brilliant application of market behavioral models to government. But Buchanan's shorter works represented here all show originality and insight as well as clear articulation of important theoretical principles. What's more, these essays have all had a significant impact on the subsequent literature about public choice.
In this volume, the works are broken down into these major categorical groupings:
1.General Approach
2.Public Choice and Its Critics
3.Voters
4.Voting Models
5.Rent Seeking
6.Regulation
7.Public Choice and Public Expenditures
As Robert D. Tollison concludes his foreword to this volumes, "Read in conjunction with the other parts of the 'Collected Works, ' these papers offer the reader a fuller appreciation of the public-choice revolution and its impact and prospects."
James M. Buchanan is an eminent economist who won the Alfred Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 1986 and is considered one of the greatest scholars of liberty in the twentieth century.
The entire series will include:
Volume 1 "The Logical Foundations of Constitutional Liberty"
Volume 2 "Public Principles of Public Debt "
Volume 3 "The Calculus of Consent "
Volume 4 "Public Finance in Democratic Process"
Volume 5 "The Demand and Supply of Public Goods"
Volume 6 "Cost and Choice"
Volume 7 "The Limits of Liberty"
Volume 8 "Democracy in Deficit"
Volume 9 "The Power to Tax"
Volume 10 "The Reason of Rules"
Volume 11 "Politics by Principle, Not Interest"
Volume 12 "Economic Inquiry and Its Logic"
Volume 13 "Politics as Public Choice"
Volume 14 "Debt and Taxes"
Volume 15 "Externalities and Public Expenditure Theory"
Volume 16 "Choice, Contract, and Constitutions"
Volume 17 "Moral Science and Moral Order"
Volume 18 "Federalism, Liberty, and the Law"
Volume 19 "Ideas, Persons, and Events"
Volume 20 "Indexes"

In his foreword, Robert D. Tollison identifies the main objective of Geoffrey Brennan and James M. Buchanan's "The Reason of Rules: " ." . . a book-length attempt to focus the energies of economists and other social analysts on the nature and function of the rules under which ordinary political life and market life function."
In persuasive style, Brennan and Buchanan argue that too often economists become mired in explaining the obvious or constructing elaborate mathematical models to shed light on trivial phenomena. Their solution: economics as a discipline would be better focused on deriving normative procedures for establishing rules so that ordinary economic life can proceed unaffected as much as possible by social issues.
In "The Reason of Rules," Brennan and Buchanan sketch out a methodological and analytical framework for the establishment of rules. They point out that the consideration of rules has its roots in classical economics and has been hinted at in the work of some contemporary economists. But the enterprise of applying the analytical rigor of modern economics to the establishment of effective rules is the little-traveled road that bears the most promise.
In fact, the basic idea of the importance of rules is a thread that runs through virtually the whole of Buchanan's distinguished career, and it is one of his signal contributions to the contemporary discipline of economics. "The Reason of Rules" is an elaboration of the potential for rules and the normative process by which they can best be devised.
James M. Buchanan is an eminent economist who won the Alfred Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 1986 and is considered one of the greatest scholars of liberty in the twentieth century.
The entire series will include:
Volume 1 "The Logical Foundations of Constitutional Liberty"
Volume 2 "Public Principles of Public Debt "
Volume 3 "The Calculus of Consent "
Volume 4 "Public Finance in Democratic Process"
Volume 5 "The Demand and Supply of Public Goods"
Volume 6 "Cost and Choice"
Volume 7 "The Limits of Liberty"
Volume 8 "Democracy in Deficit"
Volume 9 "The Power to Tax"
Volume 10 "The Reason of Rules"
Volume 11 "Politics by Principle, Not Interest"
Volume 12 "Economic Inquiry and Its Logic"
Volume 13 "Politics as Public Choice"
Volume 14 "Debt and Taxes"
Volume 15 "Externalities and Public Expenditure Theory"
Volume 16 "Choice, Contract, and Constitutions"
Volume 17 "Moral Science and Moral Order"
Volume 18 "Federalism, Liberty, and the Law"
Volume 19 "Ideas, Persons, and Events"
Volume 20 "Indexes"

Public-goods theory constituted a major element in James M. Buchanan's research agenda throughout the 1960s. "The Demand and Supply of Public Goods" is a major part of that work.
At the time that Buchanan was elaborating on his theories of public goods, the prevailing trend in public economics was the emergence of public-expenditure theory, which attempted to form a comprehensive theory of the state around the notion of market failure.
"The Demand and Supply of Public Goods" established Buchanan's broad purpose of explicitly comparing market performance with political performance. As such, the book is an important part of Buchanan's contractarian theory of the "productive state."
Conceived originally as a series of lectures given at Cambridge University in 1961 and 1962, "The Demand and Supply of Public Goods" is written for students, but is in no way a textbook of dry pedagogy. Instead, as Geoffrey Brennan writes in the foreword, "What Buchanan provides here is a clear statement of the contractarian approach to public goods problems, very much in the 'voluntary exchange' tradition of Wicksell and Lindhal."
James M. Buchanan is an eminent economist who won the Alfred Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 1986 and is considered one of the greatest scholars of liberty in the twentieth century.
The entire series will include:
Volume 1 "The Logical Foundations of Constitutional Liberty"
Volume 2 "Public Principles of Public Debt "
Volume 3 "The Calculus of Consent "
Volume 4 "Public Finance in Democratic Process"
Volume 5 "The Demand and Supply of Public Goods"
Volume 6 "Cost and Choice"
Volume 7 "The Limits of Liberty"
Volume 8 "Democracy in Deficit"
Volume 9 "The Power to Tax"
Volume 10 "The Reason of Rules"
Volume 11 "Politics by Principle, Not Interest"
Volume 12 "Economic Inquiry and Its Logic"
Volume 13 "Politics as Public Choice"
Volume 14 "Debt and Taxes"
Volume 15 "Externalities and Public Expenditure Theory"
Volume 16 "Choice, Contract, and Constitutions"
Volume 17 "Moral Science and Moral Order"
Volume 18 "Federalism, Liberty, and the Law"
Volume 19 "Ideas, Persons, and Events"
Volume 20 "Indexes"

As diverse as the papers presented in this volume may seem at first glance, all of them touch on two characteristic themes of James Buchanan's work: the respect for individual sovereignty and the threat of monopoly power on the rights of the individual.
In his foreword, Hartmut Kliemt says, "As opposed to more extreme and more utopian libertarians, Buchanan] well understands that in our world it takes a state to defend the individual from the state. Buchanan, therefore, is not an anarchist but, rather, what may be called a 'reluctant anarchist' who accepts both that the state is the greatest threat to individual sovereignty and that without some statelike monopoly, individual sovereignty cannot be protected."
The twenty-six essays included in "Federalism, Liberty, and the Law" are grouped into these categories:
1.The Analytics of Federalism
2.Federalism and Freedom
3.Liberty, Man, and the State
4.The Constitution of Markets
5.Economists, Efficiency, and the Law
6.Law, Money, and Crime
The central issue that unites the pieces in this volume is monopoly power and its control. As a libertarian, Buchanan sees government as the greatest threat--and also the greatest protector--of individual liberties.
James M. Buchanan is an eminent economist who won the Alfred Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 1986 and is considered one of the greatest scholars of liberty in the twentieth century.
The entire series will include:
Volume 1 "The Logical Foundations of Constitutional Liberty"
Volume 2 "Public Principles of Public Debt "
Volume 3 "The Calculus of Consent "
Volume 4 "Public Finance in Democratic Process"
Volume 5 "The Demand and Supply of Public Goods"
Volume 6 "Cost and Choice"
Volume 7 "The Limits of Liberty"
Volume 8 "Democracy in Deficit"
Volume 9 "The Power to Tax"
Volume 10 "The Reason of Rules"
Volume 11 "Politics by Principle, Not Interest"
Volume 12 "Economic Inquiry and Its Logic"
Volume 13 "Politics as Public Choice"
Volume 14 "Debt and Taxes"
Volume 15 "Externalities and Public Expenditure Theory"
Volume 16 "Choice, Contract, and Constitutions"
Volume 17 "Moral Science and Moral Order"
Volume 18 "Federalism, Liberty, and the Law"
Volume 19 "Ideas, Persons, and Events"
Volume 20 "Indexes"

This volume presents a collection of thirty-four essays and shorter works by James M. Buchanan that represent the brilliance of his founding work on public-choice theory.
The work of James M. Buchanan is perhaps most often associated with his helping to found public-choice theory. Buchanan's book-length works such as "The Calculus of Consent" or "The Reason of Rules" (Volumes 3 and 10, respectively, in Liberty Fund's "The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan") are best known for their brilliant application of market behavioral models to government. But Buchanan's shorter works represented here all show originality and insight as well as clear articulation of important theoretical principles. What's more, these essays have all had a significant impact on the subsequent literature about public choice.
In this volume, the works are broken down into these major categorical groupings:
1.General Approach
2.Public Choice and Its Critics
3.Voters
4.Voting Models
5.Rent Seeking
6.Regulation
7.Public Choice and Public Expenditures
As Robert D. Tollison concludes his foreword to this volumes, "Read in conjunction with the other parts of the 'Collected Works, ' these papers offer the reader a fuller appreciation of the public-choice revolution and its impact and prospects."
James M. Buchanan is an eminent economist who won the Alfred Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 1986 and is considered one of the greatest scholars of liberty in the twentieth century.
The entire series will include:
Volume 1 "The Logical Foundations of Constitutional Liberty"
Volume 2 "Public Principles of Public Debt "
Volume 3 "The Calculus of Consent "
Volume 4 "Public Finance in Democratic Process"
Volume 5 "The Demand and Supply of Public Goods"
Volume 6 "Cost and Choice"
Volume 7 "The Limits of Liberty"
Volume 8 "Democracy in Deficit"
Volume 9 "The Power to Tax"
Volume 10 "The Reason of Rules"
Volume 11 "Politics by Principle, Not Interest"
Volume 12 "Economic Inquiry and Its Logic"
Volume 13 "Politics as Public Choice"
Volume 14 "Debt and Taxes"
Volume 15 "Externalities and Public Expenditure Theory"
Volume 16 "Choice, Contract, and Constitutions"
Volume 17 "Moral Science and Moral Order"
Volume 18 "Federalism, Liberty, and the Law"
Volume 19 "Ideas, Persons, and Events"
Volume 20 "Indexes"

This final volume (save for the Index) in Liberty Fund's "The Collected Works of James M Buchanan" acquaints us most intimately with the man himself. Included are essays and short pieces that shed light on Buchanan's view of the world. Ranging from personal reflections on the art and science of economics, to restatements of his central themes and reminiscences of his encounters and collaborations with other great thinkers, this volume presents James Buchanan as a multidimensional human being, not just as a great economic and political thinker.The thirty-three pieces collected in "Ideas, Persons and Events" are grouped into these categories: autobiographical and personal reflections; reflections on fellow political economists; political economy in the post-socialist century; reform without romance. As Hartmut Kliemt states in his foreword, "The personal and the theoretical are often inseparably intertwined in the essays of this volume...As a case in point, consider James Buchanan's account of his relationship to Frank Knight. This account not only sheds some interesting light on the personal element in the development of science, it also offers some new perspectives on the concept of the 'relatively absolute absolutes', which has been so central to Buchanan's thinking in general."

This final volume (save for the Index) in Liberty Fund's "The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan" acquaints us most intimately with the man himself. Included are essays and short pieces that shed light on Buchanan's view of the world.
Ranging from personal reflections on the art and science of economics, to restatements of his central themes and reminiscences of his encounters and collaborations with other great thinkers, this volume presents James Buchanan as a multidimensional human being, not just as a great economic and political thinker.
The thirty-three pieces collected in "Ideas, Persons, and Events" are grouped into these categories:
1.Autobiographical and Personal Reflections
2.Reflections on Fellow Political Economists
3.Political Economy in the Post-Socialist Century
4.Reform without Romance
As Hartmut Kliemt states in his foreword, "The personal and the theoretical are often inseparably intertwined in the essays of this volume. . . . As a case in point, consider James Buchanan's account of his relationship to Frank Knight. This account not only sheds some interesting light on the personal element in the development of science, it also offers some new perspectives on the concept of the 'relatively absolute absolutes, ' which has been so central to Buchanan's thinking in general."
James M. Buchanan is an eminent economist who won the Alfred Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 1986 and is considered one of the greatest scholars of liberty in the twentieth century.
The entire series will include:
Volume 1 "The Logical Foundations of Constitutional Liberty"
Volume 2 "Public Principles of Public Debt "
Volume 3 "The Calculus of Consent "
Volume 4 "Public Finance in Democratic Process"
Volume 5 "The Demand and Supply of Public Goods"
Volume 6 "Cost and Choice"
Volume 7 "The Limits of Liberty"
Volume 8 "Democracy in Deficit"
Volume 9 "The Power to Tax"
Volume 10 "The Reason of Rules"
Volume 11 "Politics by Principle, Not Interest"
Volume 12 "Economic Inquiry and Its Logic"
Volume 13 "Politics as Public Choice"
Volume 14 "Debt and Taxes"
Volume 15 "Externalities and Public Expenditure Theory"
Volume 16 "Choice, Contract, and Constitutions"
Volume 17 "Moral Science and Moral Order"
Volume 18 "Federalism, Liberty, and the Law"
Volume 19 "Ideas, Persons, and Events"
Volume 20 "Indexes"

In his foreword, Geoffrey Brennan states, "The papers in this volume represent a coherent set of pieces focused on aspects of public-expenditure theory and constitute all of Buchanan's papers in this area."

Buchanan's work on the subject of what governments should do and his insistence on Knut Wicksell's ideal that taxation and public expenditure be integrated topics have contributed significantly to the current thinking of most economists on the topic. Geoffrey Brennan summarizes Buchanan's central themes in this way, "There are two messages that emerge from this work: one is that a proper sense of the "extent" of market failure, rather than its mere "presence, " is relevant in all cases; the other is that 'correcting' for such market failure is often a complex multidimensional business not captured by direct public provision at zero price and not necessarily involving expansion of market output."

The twenty-nine papers represented in this volume are grouped into these major subject categories:
1.Public Services and Collective Action
2.Externalities
3.Clubs and Joint Supply
4.Public Goods Theory
5.Applications--City, Health, and Social Security
6.Distributive Norms and Collective Action

This volume also includes what are arguably Buchanan's two most famous articles: "Externality," which he wrote with William Stubblebine, and "Economic Theory of Clubs."

James M. Buchanan is an eminent economist who won the Alfred Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 1986 and is considered one of the greatest scholars of liberty in the twentieth century.

ERRATA
Unfortunately, after this book had been printed and bound, it was discovered that, due to a production error, the index contained some erroneous page numbers. Please click on the pdf file below to obtain the corrected index that should replace the index bound into the back of the book. When this volume goes back to press for a second printing, the index will be updated with the pages in this pdf file, and we will be pleased to send all buyers of the erroneous Volume 15 a corrected copy of the book at no extra charge.
Click here for a pdf file of the corrected index.
The entire series will include:
Volume 1 "The Logical Foundations of Constitutional Liberty"
Volume 2 "Public Principles of Public Debt "
Volume 3 "The Calculus of Consent "
Volume 4 "Public Finance in Democratic Process"
Volume 5 "The Demand and Supply of Public Goods"
Volume 6 "Cost and Choice"
Volume 7 "The Limits of Liberty"
Volume 8 "Democracy in Deficit"
Volume 9 "The Power to Tax"
Volume 10 "The Reason of Rules"
Volume 11 "Politics by Principle, Not Interest"
Volume 12 "Economic Inquiry and Its Logic"
Volume 13 "Politics as Public Choice"
Volume 14 "Debt and Taxes"
Volume 15 "Externalities and Public Expenditure Theory"
Volume 16 "Choice, Contract, and Constitutions"
Volume 17 "Moral Science and Moral Order"
/div>

As diverse as the papers presented in this volume may seem at first glance, all of them touch on two characteristic themes of James Buchanan's work: the respect for individual sovereignty and the threat of monopoly power on the rights of the individual.
In his foreword, Hartmut Kliemt says, "As opposed to more extreme and more utopian libertarians, Buchanan] well understands that in our world it takes a state to defend the individual from the state. Buchanan, therefore, is not an anarchist but, rather, what may be called a 'reluctant anarchist' who accepts both that the state is the greatest threat to individual sovereignty and that without some statelike monopoly, individual sovereignty cannot be protected."
The twenty-six essays included in "Federalism, Liberty, and the Law" are grouped into these categories:
1.The Analytics of Federalism
2.Federalism and Freedom
3.Liberty, Man, and the State
4.The Constitution of Markets
5.Economists, Efficiency, and the Law
6.Law, Money, and Crime
The central issue that unites the pieces in this volume is monopoly power and its control. As a libertarian, Buchanan sees government as the greatest threat--and also the greatest protector--of individual liberties.
James M. Buchanan is an eminent economist who won the Alfred Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 1986 and is considered one of the greatest scholars of liberty in the twentieth century.
The entire series will include:
Volume 1 "The Logical Foundations of Constitutional Liberty"
Volume 2 "Public Principles of Public Debt "
Volume 3 "The Calculus of Consent "
Volume 4 "Public Finance in Democratic Process"
Volume 5 "The Demand and Supply of Public Goods"
Volume 6 "Cost and Choice"
Volume 7 "The Limits of Liberty"
Volume 8 "Democracy in Deficit"
Volume 9 "The Power to Tax"
Volume 10 "The Reason of Rules"
Volume 11 "Politics by Principle, Not Interest"
Volume 12 "Economic Inquiry and Its Logic"
Volume 13 "Politics as Public Choice"
Volume 14 "Debt and Taxes"
Volume 15 "Externalities and Public Expenditure Theory"
Volume 16 "Choice, Contract, and Constitutions"
Volume 17 "Moral Science and Moral Order"
Volume 18 "Federalism, Liberty, and the Law"
Volume 19 "Ideas, Persons, and Events"
Volume 20 "Indexes"

Constitutional political economy is the theme of the papers collected in this volume. This entire area of contemporary economic thought is a legacy of James M. Buchanan.
In outlining the importance of this volume to the contemporary study of economics and to the work of James M. Buchanan, Robert D. Tollison states in his foreword, "Buchanan literally founded the field of constitutional political economy. . . . His] insistence on the importance of rules was an important innovation in economics, and, over the past thirty years or so, the analytical and empirical relevance of Buchanan's constitutional perspective has become apparent."
The thirty-five papers represented in this volume are grouped into these major subject categories:
1.Foundational Issues
2.The Method of Constitutional Economics
3.Incentives and Constitutional Choice
4.Constitutional Order
5.Market Order
6.Distributional Issues
7.Fiscal and Monetary Constitutions
8.Reform
For Buchanan, his work in constitutional political economy is just the first step. He is concerned with inducing economists and other scholars to take the constitutional problem seriously. As they do, says Robert D. Tollison, "the face of modern economics will be changed."
James M. Buchanan is an eminent economist who won the Alfred Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 1986 and is considered one of the greatest scholars of liberty in the twentieth century.
The entire series will include:
Volume 1 "The Logical Foundations of Constitutional Liberty"
Volume 2 "Public Principles of Public Debt "
Volume 3 "The Calculus of Consent "
Volume 4 "Public Finance in Democratic Process"
Volume 5 "The Demand and Supply of Public Goods"
Volume 6 "Cost and Choice"
Volume 7 "The Limits of Liberty"
Volume 8 "Democracy in Deficit"
Volume 9 "The Power to Tax"
Volume 10 "The Reason of Rules"
Volume 11 "Politics by Principle, Not Interest"
Volume 12 "Economic Inquiry and Its Logic"
Volume 13 "Politics as Public Choice"
Volume 14 "Debt and Taxes"
Volume 15 "Externalities and Public Expenditure Theory"
Volume 16 "Choice, Contract, and Constitutions"
Volume 17 "Moral Science and Moral Order"
Volume 18 "Federalism, Liberty, and the Law"
Volume 19 "Ideas, Persons, and Events"
Volume 20 "Indexes"

This volume presents a collection of Buchanan's most representative works in economic method and analysis. As Robert D Tollison points out in his foreword, "(Included) in this volume are some of (Buchanan's) most often cited works on methodology, including papers reflecting his emphasis on the subjective nature of opportunity costs and the implications of this subjectivity for economic analysis." The works collected in this volume also demonstrate Buchanan's interest throughout his career in the ideas and issues posed by economic theory. Buchanan shows throughout this volume that he believes economic theory can help explain the world around us. Spanning nearly his entire fifty-year career, Buchanan's writings in this volume exhibit a consistency of thought and belief as ideas recur from paper to paper, ever richer and more resonant.The thirty-six works represented here are grouped into the major categories: the practice and method of economic theory; competition and entrepreneurship; the theory of monopoly; input prices; opportunity cost and efficient prices; increasing returns and the work ethic; economic theory in a post-Socialist world.Clearly, these papers as a whole reflect a broad range of issues and provide us with countless insights. More than this, they give us a picture of the theorist in his workshop. They acquaint us with what interests him and how he deals with important issues. In his conclusion to the opening essay, 'Is Economics the Science of Choice?' Buchanan typifies the richness of thought available throughout this volume: "Modern economics, as practiced by professional scholars, embodies confusions that are fundamentally methodological. For myself, I advance no claim that my own thinking has yet fully rid itself of the paradigms of neoclassical orthodoxy."

In his foreword, Geoffrey Brennan states, "The papers in this volume represent a coherent set of pieces focused on aspects of public-expenditure theory and constitute all of Buchanan's papers in this area."

Buchanan's work on the subject of what governments should do and his insistence on Knut Wicksell's ideal that taxation and public expenditure be integrated topics have contributed significantly to the current thinking of most economists on the topic. Geoffrey Brennan summarizes Buchanan's central themes in this way, "There are two messages that emerge from this work: one is that a proper sense of the "extent" of market failure, rather than its mere "presence, " is relevant in all cases; the other is that 'correcting' for such market failure is often a complex multidimensional business not captured by direct public provision at zero price and not necessarily involving expansion of market output."

The twenty-nine papers represented in this volume are grouped into these major subject categories:
1.Public Services and Collective Action
2.Externalities
3.Clubs and Joint Supply
4.Public Goods Theory
5.Applications--City, Health, and Social Security
6.Distributive Norms and Collective Action

This volume also includes what are arguably Buchanan's two most famous articles: "Externality," which he wrote with William Stubblebine, and "Economic Theory of Clubs."

James M. Buchanan is an eminent economist who won the Alfred Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 1986 and is considered one of the greatest scholars of liberty in the twentieth century.

ERRATA
Unfortunately, after this book had been printed and bound, it was discovered that, due to a production error, the index contained some erroneous page numbers. Please click on the pdf file below to obtain the corrected index that should replace the index bound into the back of the book. When this volume goes back to press for a second printing, the index will be updated with the pages in this pdf file, and we will be pleased to send all buyers of the erroneous Volume 15 a corrected copy of the book at no extra charge.
Click here for a pdf file of the corrected index.
The entire series will include:
Volume 1 "The Logical Foundations of Constitutional Liberty"
Volume 2 "Public Principles of Public Debt "
Volume 3 "The Calculus of Consent "
Volume 4 "Public Finance in Democratic Process"
Volume 5 "The Demand and Supply of Public Goods"
Volume 6 "Cost and Choice"
Volume 7 "The Limits of Liberty"
Volume 8 "Democracy in Deficit"
Volume 9 "The Power to Tax"
Volume 10 "The Reason of Rules"
Volume 11 "Politics by Principle, Not Interest"
Volume 12 "Economic Inquiry and Its Logic"
Volume 13 "Politics as Public Choice"
Volume 14 "Debt and Taxes"
Volume 15 "Externalities and Public Expenditure Theory"
Volume 16 "Choice, Contract, and Constitutions"
Volume 17 "Moral Science and Moral Order"
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This volume is a collection of sixteen essays on three general topics: the methodology of economics, the applicability of economic reasoning to political science and other social sciences, and the relevance of economics as moral philosophy. Several essays are published here for the first time, including "Professor Alchian on Economic Method," "Natural and Artifactual Man," and "Public Choice and Ideology."This book provides relatively easy access to a wide range of work by a moral and legal philosopher, a welfare economist who has consistently defended the primacy of the contractarian ethic, a public finance theorist, and a founder of the burgeoning subdiscipline of public choice. Buchanan's work has spawned a methodological revolution in the way economists and other scholars think about government and government activity.As a measure of recognition for his significant contribution, Dr. Buchanan was awarded the 1986 Nobel Prize in Economics.